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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the Minnesota Sentencing
1
Guidelines in the late 1970s, one of the most important legal issues
has been identifying what situations justify departure from the
Guidelines. In particular, a line of cases since the early 1980s has
† J.D. Candidate, 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Government,
2003, Liberty University.
1. 9 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES—
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 36.24 (3d ed. 2001).
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considered the circumstances under which concealment of a body
after a homicide can be an aggravating factor that justifies
2
departure from the Guidelines. The Minnesota Supreme Court
3
recently clarified this area of the law in State v. Leja. The court
held that concealing a body could be an aggravating factor if the
defendant either commits additional aggravating factors or uses
personal knowledge about the location of the body to bargain for a
4
more favorable sentence.
This Case Note examines an unexplored issue in the academic
literature, which is whether the aggravating factor for concealment
under the sentencing guidelines of many jurisdictions violates the
right against self-incrimination. This Case Note makes an initial
contribution to this discussion by applying the current selfincrimination precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court to the
aggravating factor, as developed by the Minnesota courts in a line
5
of cases leading up to Leja.
This Case Note argues that
Minnesota’s aggravating factor violates the constitutional right
6
against self-incrimination. Part II of this Case Note explores the
history of the Guidelines and legal precedents in Minnesota that
7
deal with departure for concealment of a body. Part III examines
the facts and the analysis provided by the Minnesota Supreme
8
Court in State v. Leja. Part IV applies the law of self-incrimination
to Minnesota’s concealment aggravating factor and concludes that
9
the aggravating factor violates the right against self-incrimination.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History, Purpose, and Operation of the Guidelines
Until the mid-1970s, all U.S. jurisdictions, including
Minnesota, used sentencing systems that provided little detail about
10
the specific sentences that judges should impose for felonies. Due
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
4. Id. at 449.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME &
JUST. 131, 141-42 (2005) (citing DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL
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to this substantial flexibility, judges had almost unfettered
11
discretion to impose sentences up to the statutory maximums.
The goal of this sentencing system was for judges to address each
12
offender individually. In the mid-1970s, commentators criticized
the flexibility of this sentencing system because they believed it
13
produced unjust disparities in sentencing and often unduly
14
lenient sentences.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many jurisdictions
implemented laws to reduce judicial discretion by creating greater
15
uniformity in sentencing.
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature
16
Minnesota
established the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
was the first jurisdiction in the United States to create mandatory
sentencing guidelines administered by an independent
commission, and many jurisdictions have since modeled their
17
sentencing guidelines on the Minnesota Guidelines.
The Legislature created the Commission and the Guidelines to
18
The
achieve consistency and proportionality in sentencing.
Sentencing Guidelines Grid is a matrix that judges use to calculate
19
presumptive sentences for defendants.
The grid assigns the
presumptive duration of a sentence based on two factors: “criminal
20
21
history” and “offense severity level.” The grid also assigns the
SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 15-21 (1988)
(discussing the judicial system prior to sentencing guidelines)).
11. Id. at 141.
12. See id. at 141-42.
13. Id. at 142 (“Some critics argued that the broad discretion exercised by
judges and parole boards permitted substantial disparities in the sentencing of
offenders convicted of similar crimes . . . .”).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing 1 ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE
SEARCH FOR REFORM 132-35 (1983)).
16. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.24.
17. Frase, supra note 10, at 131 (“Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to
implement legally binding sentencing guidelines developed by an independent
sentencing commission. Minnesota’s guidelines have served as a model for other
state guidelines reforms, and for revised American Bar Association and Model
Penal Code sentencing standards . . . .”); see also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(e) (2d ed. 1999) (“Since Minnesota first adopted
presumptive sentencing guidelines in 1980, they have proved more popular . . . .
By the mid-1990’s, well over a dozen states and the federal government had
adopted sentencing guidelines and nearly as many were in the process of creating
or studying them.”).
18. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY § I (2004) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
19. See generally id. § IV (Sentencing Guidelines Grid).
20. See generally id. § II.B (the criminal history index).
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presumptive disposition of a sentence, which determines whether a
22
judge must presumptively execute or stay a sentence.
A judge may depart from the Guidelines in two ways. A
durational departure occurs when a judge alters the presumptive
23
duration of a sentence. The presumptive duration of a sentence
is the range of months specified in the Guidelines within which a
24
judge must sentence a felon. When a judge issues a sentence that
is outside this range, the judge has made a durational departure
25
from the Guidelines.
A dispositional departure occurs when a judge alters the
26
The departure occurs
presumptive disposition of a sentence.
when a judge decides to impose intermediate sanctions, such as
“probation, local incarceration, community work, treatment, [or]
27
financial sanctions.” When a judge issues a disposition other than
what the Guidelines specify, the judge has made a dispositional
28
departure from the Guidelines.
The Commission and the Minnesota courts have established
standards for judicial departure from the Guidelines. To depart
from the Guidelines, there must be “substantial and compelling
29
circumstances” that justify the departure.
A crime must be
21. See generally id. § II.A (the offense severity level).
22. Id. § II.C. A presumptively executed sentence involves “commitment to
state prisonment.” Id. § IV. A presumptively stayed sentence involves “up to a year
in jail and/or other non-jail sanctions can be imposed as conditions of probation.”
Id.
23. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.30.
24. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND
SUMMARY STATISTICS 1, 5 (2001) [hereinafter GUIDELINES BACKGROUND], available at
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/background.pdf.
25. Id. “In 1999, 11.6% of offenders sentenced to executed prison sentenced
[sic] received aggravated (upward) durational departures; 25.5% received
mitigated (downward) durational departures.” Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. “In 1999, 4.7% of all felony offenders received an aggravated
(upward) dispositional departure (10.4% of those recommended probation).” Id.
“In 1999, 12.9% of all cases (30.8% of those recommended prison), received a
mitigated dispositional departure.” Id.
29. E.g., State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 1998) (“[T]here must
be ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in the record to justify a departure.”
(quoting Rairdon v. State, 577 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Minn. 1996))); see also
GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D (“The judge shall utilize the presumptive
sentence provided in the sentencing guidelines unless the individual case involves
substantial and compelling circumstances. When such circumstances are present,
the judge may depart from the presumptive sentence and stay or impose any
sentence authorized by law.”).
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unusual in severity compared to the normal type of crime at issue
30
to depart from the Guideline’s presumptive sentences. A crime is
31
unusual in severity if it involves aggravating or mitigating factors.
If a judge departs from the Guidelines, the sentence must still be
32
proportional to the severity of the crime at issue. Departure from
33
the Guidelines must be infrequent because too many departures
34
will undermine the purpose of the Guidelines.
B. Concealment of a Victim’s Body and Durational Departure
Minnesota courts have considered whether concealment of a
victim’s body after a homicide justifies upward departure from the
Guidelines since the early 1980s. The first case that the Minnesota
35
Supreme Court decided on this issue was State v. Shiue. In that
case, the defendant kidnapped three people, including a six-year36
old boy.
The defendant killed the young boy shortly after

30. See State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. 1999) (requiring
consideration of whether the conduct was “significantly more or less serious than
that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question” (quoting State
v. Back, 341 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. 1983))); see also State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641,
643 (Minn. 1984) (“The general issue . . . is whether the defendant’s conduct was
significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of
the crime in question.”).
31. E.g., Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 88 (“[A] sentencing court has no discretion to
depart from the sentencing guidelines unless aggravating or mitigating factors are
present.”). The list of factors that will justify departure from the Guidelines is not
exclusive. Id. at 89. “In most cases, where upward departures have been sustained,
more than one factor is present.” MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 1, § 36.30.
32. GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D (When departing from the presumptive
sentence, “the court should pronounce a sentence which is proportional to the
severity of the offense of conviction”); Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 89 (“When a
sentencing court departs from the presumptive sentence, it must still strive to
determine a sentence that is proportional to the severity of the offense.”).
33. See State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981) (stating that
reasons for departure exist in only “a small number of cases”); see also GUIDELINES,
supra note 18, § II.D cmt. II.D.01 (“The guideline sentences are presumed to be
appropriate for every case. However, there will be a small number of cases where
substantial and compelling aggravating or mitigating factors are present.”).
34. GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § II.D cmt. II.D.03 (“The purposes of the
sentencing guidelines cannot be achieved unless the presumptive sentences are
applied with a high degree of regularity.”); Spain, 590 N.W.2d at 88 (“The
purposes of the sentencing guidelines will not be served if the trial courts
generally fail to apply the presumptive sentences found in the guidelines.”);
Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d at 487 (“[T]he purposes of the law will not be served if
judges fail to follow the guidelines in the ‘general’ case.”).
35. 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982).
36. Id. at 649.
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37

kidnapping him, and he concealed the body.
The other two
victims later escaped and reported the defendant to the police, who
38
arrested him soon after. The defendant revealed the location of
the victim’s body only after the County Attorney agreed not to
39
charge him with first-degree murder. A jury found the defendant
40
guilty of kidnapping and second-degree murder.
The district
court departed from the Guidelines, citing six aggravating factors,
41
including concealment of the victim’s body.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
concealment of a body is an aggravating factor that justifies an
upward durational departure from the Guidelines for three
42
reasons.
First, concealment of the victim’s body causes severe
emotional harm to the victim’s family members because they are
43
Second, an
unaware of the victim’s location and well-being.
increased sentence is necessary to deter defendants from using
their personal knowledge about the location of the body to bargain
44
for a reduced sentence. The court believed the risk of a higher
sentence would compel the defendant’s attorney or the authorities
to inform the defendant about the risks of not revealing the
45
location of the body.
Third, concealment of a body is an
46
aggravating factor in other jurisdictions. Thus, the court found
that concealment of a body should be an aggravating factor in
47
Minnesota.
In State v. Schmit, the Minnesota Supreme Court carved out a
48
potential exception to its prior holding in Shiue. In Schmit, the

37. See id. at 650-51.
38. Id. at 650.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 652.
41. Id. at 654. The trial court cited six grounds for upward durational
departure: (1) vulnerability of the victim, (2) no provocation by the victim, (3) the
victim being treated with particular cruelty, (4) a prior felony offense involving the
victim, (5) planning and concealment, and (6) prior break ins, which negated the
defendant’s lack of felony record. Id.
42. Id. at 655.
43. See id. (“For five months, [the victim’s] family suffered a great deal of
trauma, not knowing whether their son was dead or alive.”).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. (citing People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. 1971); Gardner v. State,
388 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ind. 1979)).
47. Id.
48. 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1983).
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49

defendant murdered his wife in her sleep. He then concealed her
50
body in an area near some train tracks. After his arrest, he did
51
not use the hidden body to bargain for a lower sentence. A jury
52
found him guilty of “first-degree heat-of-passion manslaughter.”
The district court departed based on a few factors, including
concealment, and the supreme court affirmed two of the factors for
53
departure. In a footnote, the court stated “[b]ecause defendant
made no effort to bargain with information concerning the
location of the body, his concealment of the body does not operate
54
as an aggravating factor in sentencing.”
Therefore, the Schmit
court limited Shiue to situations where a defendant bargains for a
55
lower sentence.
Following Schmit, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied
56
In State v.
Shiue and Schmit to a series of homicide cases.
Shoebottom, the defendant shot his wife after she handed him a gun
57
and dared him to shoot her.
He then burned her body and
58
He only revealed the location of the
concealed the remains.
remains after the County Attorney agreed not to charge him with
59
first-degree murder.
The district court departed from the
sentencing guidelines exclusively because of the concealment of
60
the body. The court of appeals affirmed the departure and held
that the facts were similar to Shiue, because the defendant had
bargained and concealed the body, which remained hidden for a
61
long period.
In State v. Jackson, the defendant hired a prostitute and

49. Id. at 56.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 58 n.1.
52. Id. at 56.
53. Id. at 58. The supreme court affirmed because (1) there was more time
separating the events than in a normal crime of this type, and (2) there was an
abuse of a relationship of trust. Id.
54. Id. at 58 n.1 (citing State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982)).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., State v. Murr, 443 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Johnston, 390 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Jackson, 370 N.W.2d 72
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Shoebottom, 355 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
57. 355 N.W.2d at 773-74.
58. Id. at 774.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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62

strangled her. He then concealed the body and destroyed the
63
prostitute’s identifying information. The district court departed
from the Guidelines and the court of appeals affirmed the
departure based on three aggravating factors, including
64
concealment.
The court of appeals held that departure was
justified even without bargaining, because the defendant attempted
to hinder identification of the body in addition to concealing the
65
body.
In State v. Johnston, the defendant beat the victim to death and
66
then attempted to dispose of the body in a nearby dumpster. A
67
jury convicted him of second-degree felony murder, and the
district court departed from sentencing guidelines based on five
68
aggravating factors, including concealment of the body.
The
court of appeals held that under Schmit, departure for concealment
69
could not be justified, because the defendant did not bargain.
The court held that Jackson did not apply, because the defendant
70
did not attempt to conceal the identity of the victim. However,
the court concluded that concealment still justified departure
71
based on the “particular cruelty” of the crime.
In State v. Murr, the defendant killed his father after he was
72
told to move out. The defendant then concealed the body in a
shallow grave at Death Valley National Park where coyotes
73
mutilated it. Concealment of the body was the only factor cited
62. 370 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id.
64. Id. The court of appeals affirmed based on three aggravating factors: (1)
the vulnerability of the victim, (2) the particular cruelty of the crime, and (3) the
concealment of the victim’s body. Id.
65. Id. (“The fact that Jackson did not attempt to negotiate a deal through his
knowledge of the location of the victim’s body does not prevent the use of
concealment in this case as an aggravating factor because, here, concealment was
coupled with other attempts at concealing the victim’s identification.”).
66. 390 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
67. Id. at 452.
68. Id. at 456. The district court cited five aggravating factors: (1) prior
convictions for personal injury, (2) particular vulnerability of victim, (3) particular
cruelty of crime, (4) crime happened in victim’s zone of privacy, and (5)
concealment of victim’s body. Id. The court of appeals affirmed all aggravating
factors cited by the trial court except numbers two and four. Id. at 457.
69. Id. at 456 (citing State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1983)).
The court explicitly noted that “appellant did not attempt such a bargain.” Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 456-57.
72. 443 N.W.2d 833, 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
73. Id.
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74

for an upward departure. The court of appeals held that Schmit
75
prohibited departure for concealment alone without bargaining.
The court cited Jackson because mutilation of the body hindered its
76
identification. The court also cited Johnston to justify departure
for concealment because it demonstrated the “particular cruelty” of
77
the crime.
In the late 1990s, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on two
more concealment cases. In both cases, the court affirmed a
departure where concealment of a body was one of a few
aggravating factors. In State v. Folkers, the defendant killed his
girlfriend in his garage, put her body in her van, and abandoned
78
the van in a parking lot. The court affirmed the departure based
on three factors, including the “particular cruelty” of concealing
79
the body. In State v. Griller, the defendant killed the victim and
80
buried the body in his backyard.
The court affirmed the
departure based on four factors, including concealment of the
81
body. In both cases, the court affirmed concealment as one of a
few factors and cited Shiue but provided no analysis justifying a
82
departure without bargaining.
Other jurisdictions have also considered whether concealment
of a body justifies departure from their respective sentencing
guidelines. No consensus exists on the issue among the various
83
84
85
jurisdictions. Indiana, Louisiana, Tennessee, and the Ninth
74. Id. at 836.
75. See id. at 836-37 (“There is some merit to Murr’s position that
concealment alone may not support an aggravated sentence.”).
76. Id. at 837 (“[T]he method of concealment . . . may still be considered. . . .
Identification of the body could be accomplished only through dental records; no
other items of identification were present.”).
77. Id. (“Murr’s transportation of his father’s body in the trunk of his car,
combined with the manner of concealment of the body that lead to its mutilation
by coyotes, relate to the ‘particular cruelty’ with which the murder was
committed.”).
78. 581 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Minn. 1998).
79. Id. at 327. The supreme court affirmed three factors supporting
departure: (1) concealment of the body, (2) lack of remorse, and (3) blaming the
murder on another person. Id.
80. 583 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Minn. 1998).
81. Id. at 744. The supreme court affirmed four factors supporting
departure: (1) concealment of the body, (2) particular cruelty, (3) lack of
remorse, and (4) shifting the blame. Id.
82. Compare Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 744 n.29 (citing Shiue with no reasoning),
with Folkers, 581 N.W.2d at 327 (citing Shiue with no reasoning).
83. Gardner v. State, 388 N.E.2d 513, 518-19 (Ind. 1979) (holding that it was
not unreasonable for the trial court to depart based in part on the defendant’s
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86

Circuit have held that concealment can be an aggravating factor.
87
88
Other jurisdictions such as Florida and Washington have
prohibited or restricted use of concealment as an aggravating
factor.
III. STATE V. LEJA
A. The Facts
Tina DeAnn Leja was involved in an abusive relationship with
89
Darnell Smith. When Leja received a phone call from Bobby Dee
Holder, Darnell ordered Leja to tell Holder that Darnell was not at
90
home and that Holder could come over. Darnell wanted Holder
to come over because he believed that Holder wanted to have sex
91
with Leja.
When Holder came over, Darnell and his younger
92
brother Chaka beat and shot Holder, killing him. Darnell and
concealment of a body and destruction of evidence).
84. State v. Williams, 633 So. 2d 309, 310 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it departed in part for
concealment of a body).
85. State v. Gordon, No. 03C01-9207-CR-234, 1993 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
162, at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1993) (holding that concealment of a
body amounts to an aggravating factor).
86. United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that destroying and concealing a body after a voluntary manslaughter is an
aggravating factor).
87. State v. McCall, 524 So. 2d 663, 665 n.1 (Fla. 1988) (“[M]utilation of a
body subsequent to death does not indicate the killing itself was excessively brutal
and therefore cannot be a valid basis for departure.”); Jackson v. State, 451 So. 2d
458, 463 (Fla. 1984) (“Actions after the death of the victim are irrelevant in
determining this aggravating circumstance.”) (citation omitted); Herzog v. State,
439 So. 2d 1372, 1380 (Fla. 1983) (“As to the trial court’s finding that the disposal
of the body is a factor that can be considered in determining heinousness, we have
held that this evidence is irrelevant on this issue.”) (citations omitted); Simmons v.
State, 419 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 1982) (holding that concealing a body through
burning provides no support for an aggravating factor); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d
1103, 1109 (Fla. 1981) (“[O]nce the victim dies, the crime of murder was
completed . . . .”); Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 1975) (“[W]hen
Arnold Tresch died, the crime of murder was completed and . . . the mutilation of
the body many hours later was not primarily the kind of misconduct contemplated
by the Legislature in providing for the consideration of aggravating
circumstances.”).
88. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
89. State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Minn. 2004).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 445.
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Chaka then cut up the body and placed the parts in a cooler. The
next day, Darnell ordered Leja to dispose of the body and told her
94
that Andre Parker would monitor her.
Leja and Parker then
proceeded to dispose of Holder’s car and body in Wisconsin and
95
northern Minnesota. About a month later, police arrested and
charged all of the people involved in the murder and disposal of
96
Holder’s remains.
B. Procedural History
97

A jury found Leja guilty of second-degree felony murder. In
sentencing Leja, the trial court departed from the Guidelines citing
“concealment” and “abuse of a position of trust” as aggravating
98
factors. The court imposed a sentence of 210 months, which was
an upward departure of 60 months from the presumptive
99
sentence.
The court of appeals considered whether departure from the
Guidelines for concealment requires bargaining by the defendant
100
with the authorities.
The court cited two reasons for affirming
101
First, the Minnesota Supreme
the district court on this issue.
Court affirmed departures in Folkers and Griller, even though
neither of the defendants in those cases used concealment to
102
bargain for a more favorable sentence.
Second, the court cited
its own precedent in Murr where it held that concealment could
justify departure for particular cruelty even in the absence of
103
bargaining.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 445-46.
96. Id. at 443, 446-47.
Darnell Smith was convicted of first-degree
premeditated murder. Id. at 443. Chaka Smith pled guilty to second-degree
felony murder. Id. Andre Parker pled guilty to aiding an offender after the fact.
Id.
97. Id. at 447. Leja was convicted of accomplice-after-the-fact, but the court
of appeals vacated that conviction. Id. She was also convicted of aiding assault in
the second degree, but that conviction was never addressed on appeal. Id. at 447
n.1.
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id.
100. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003), modified, 684
N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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C. The Findings of the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court only considered whether Leja’s
concealment of the body presented “substantial and compelling
circumstances” that justified upward departure from the
104
Guidelines.
The court held that the facts in this case did not
105
The Schmit case led the court to conclude
meet this standard.
that the policy rationales from Shiue did not apply, because Leja
106
never bargained for a favorable sentence.
The court
distinguished Folkers and Griller, where it held that concealment of a
107
body was an aggravating factor without bargaining, by explaining
that many factors justified departure in those cases, and
108
concealment was not the exclusive factor justifying departure.
The court concluded that Leja’s conduct was not “substantial and
compelling,” and modified the sentence to the presumptive
109
duration level.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Minnesota’s Concealment Aggravating Factor
Under Minnesota law, concealment is an aggravating factor in
certain situations. In Shiue, it seemed like concealment might
110
In Schmit, the supreme court
always be an aggravating factor.
limited the aggravating factor to situations where a defendant
111
bargains. The court of appeals technically followed Schmit in the

104. Leja, 684 N.W.2d at 447-48. The State argued that “abuse of position of
trust” was an aggravating factor before the district court, but did not advance this
argument on appeal. Id. at 447.
105. Id. at 450.
106. See id. at 449 (“These independent policy concerns are not present
here.”).
107. Id. (“In State v. Folkers and State v. Griller . . . there had been no effort to
use the body’s location to negotiate a more favorable charge.” (citing State v.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 744 n.9 (Minn. 1998); State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321,
327 (Minn. 1998))).
108. Id. (“We have not decided a case where concealment, standing alone, was
cited approvingly as a sufficient aggravating factor supporting an upward
departure.”).
109. Id. at 450 (“Leja’s participation in the concealment of Holder’s remains,
without more such as her bargaining with the authorities, does not support an
upward durational departure.”).
110. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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112

cases that followed.
In practice, the court of appeals may have
circumvented Schmit by justifying departure for concealment in the
113
absence of bargaining based on particular cruelty.
In the late
1990s, the supreme court moved away from Schmit in Folkers and
Griller when it held, without explanation, that concealment justified
114
departure in the absence of bargaining. The supreme court may
have been following the “particular cruelty” rationale for departure
115
that the court of appeals had previously adopted.
The supreme court attempted to reconcile these conflicting
precedents in Leja when it held that two situations justify departure
for concealment. First, departure can be justified if the defendant
uses the location of the victim’s body to bargain for a favorable
116
sentence.
Second, departure can be justified if the defendant
117
commits other aggravating factors in addition to concealment.
B. The Historical Origin and Purpose of the Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination originated in the
118
In the early eighteenth-century, common
English common law.
law courts established a general right against self-incrimination,
which gave defendants the right not to testify about incriminating
119
information in civil or criminal cases.
Some American colonies
120
modeled the common law right against self-incrimination. Eight
states had a right against self-incrimination in their constitutions
121
prior to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment.
Because there
is little “helpful legislative history” relating to the Fifth
122
Amendment,
the Supreme Court has operated on the

112. See supra notes 69, 75 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 65, 71, 77 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
115. See State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 1998) (“Folkers treated
the victim with particular cruelty in that he attempted to conceal her body . . . .”).
116. See State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Minn. 2004) (“[I]f concealment
was not considered an aggravating factor, the accused would be able to use the
concern of the victim’s family to negotiate a favorable plea agreement in return
for disclosing the location of the victim’s body.”).
117. See id. at 449 (“We note, however, that the upward durational departures
in both Folkers and Griller were based on multiple aggravating factors, of which
concealment of the body was but a single factor.”).
118. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.14(b) (3d ed. 2000).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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assumption that the framers adopted the privilege as it existed at
123
common law.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions contain
identically worded provisions that protect against self124
incrimination.
The Supreme Court has cited many purposes for
125
the right against self-incrimination. Protection of the adversarial
126
The
system is one of the primary functions of the privilege.
American legal system assumes that a contested process, where the
State must prove the guilt of the defendant before a neutral judge,
127
is the best means to determine whether a defendant is guilty.
The use of independent evidence instead of coercion is important
128
to the effectiveness of this process.
C. The Elements of Self-Incrimination
The Supreme Court has held that a state action violates the

123. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674 n.5 (1998) (“What we know of
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, however,
gives no indication that the Framers had any sense of a privilege more
comprehensive than common law practice then revealed.”).
124. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that Fifth Amendment protections against selfincrimination apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
125. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
The Supreme Court has offered the following rationales for the privilege:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a fair stateindividual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load,”; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life,”; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our
realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is
often “a protection to the innocent.”
Id. (citations omitted).
126. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (“[O]urs is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.”).
127. See id.
128. See id.
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right against self-incrimination when three elements are present.
“There must be (1) compulsion of a (2) testimonial
130
communication that is (3) incriminating.”
The following
discussion will examine whether Minnesota’s use of concealment as
an aggravating factor satisfies these elements.
1.

The Compulsion Element

The Supreme Court has held that any state-created penalty
that punishes a person for remaining silent about incriminating
131
The term “penalty” has a broad
information is compulsion.
meaning that includes the imposition of any sanction that makes
132
silence “costly.”
A person may be compelled to provide
incriminating testimony only if that person is offered complete
immunity from any future criminal penalty that might result from
133
revealing the information.
Any state-imposed penalty for exercising the right against self134
incrimination is prima facie unconstitutional. A person normally
must assert the right against self-incrimination if the State requests
135
testimony that is reasonably incriminating.
The Supreme Court
has held that this principle does not apply if a person will suffer a
129. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979); see also
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment . . .
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial
Communication that is incriminating.”).
130. Authement, 607 F.2d at 1131 (citation omitted).
131. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[A] State may
not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.”); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (“The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal
infringement--the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence.”).
132. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). The privilege prohibits any
form of “compulsion,” and it is not limited to “economic sanctions” or
“imprisonment.” Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 806.
133. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1973) (“Immunity is required if
there is to be ‘rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.’”)
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972)); United States v.
Lawson, 255 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Minn. 1966) (“Where a statute forces the
individual to choose between answering or being punished for invoking the
privilege, without at the same time granting a complete immunity, then it becomes
unconstitutional.”).
134. See Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805-07.
135. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
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state-imposed penalty for exercising the privilege because a penalty
136
If a
forecloses the possibility of free assertion of the privilege.
person reveals incriminating information under either an express
or implied threat of a State-imposed penalty, the person has not
waived the privilege, and the State would be unable to use any
137
incriminating testimony in future criminal proceedings.
An upward departure for concealment of a body is a penalty
that compels testimony. Many jurisdictions have correctly held that
imposition of a higher sentence for exercising the privilege is an
138
unconstitutional penalty.
Making something an aggravating
factor empowers judges to issue stronger penalties. Thus, the
aggravating factor for concealment is a penalty for the act of
concealment. Assuming that the other elements are satisfied, the
aggravating factor for concealment would be prima facie
unconstitutional, because the accused has not waived the privilege
139
if there is a penalty for silence.
The State would not be able to
use any incriminating evidence obtained through this aggravating
140
factor in a future criminal proceeding.
2.

The Testimonial Communication Element

The testimonial communication element includes any
141
information that a person communicates to the State.
The
136. Id. at 434; see also Turley, 414 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that “[a] waiver
secured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be termed
voluntary”).
137. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“[A] defendant does not have ‘a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer’ if he knows he will be incarcerated for a longer period of time if he does
not make the incriminating statements. The touchstone of the fifth amendment is
compulsion, and the Supreme Court has recognized that imprisonment is one of a
wide variety of penalties which can serve to trigger a constitutional violation.”);
United States v. Heubel, 864 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]here a
defendant invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in a timely manner, a sentencing court may not use his or her failure to waive that
right as negative evidence to penalize him or her in deciding upon the
appropriate sentence.”); State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991, 996 (Mont. 2002) (“[W]e
cannot uphold a sentence that is based on a refusal to admit guilt . . . . Therefore,
we hold that the District Court improperly penalized Shreves for maintaining his
innocence pursuant to his constitutional right to remain silent.”).
139. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966) (“A nod or
headshake is as much a ‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ act in this sense as are
spoken words. But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts
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method of communication is irrelevant, because all forms of
142
This element primarily excludes
communication are included.
any evidence the State does not obtain through communication by
the defendant. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
collecting physical evidence from a person’s body is not a
143
testimonial communication.
Punishing a defendant for failure to reveal the location of a
concealed body is a testimonial communication. Two questions
will help to clarify why revealing the location of the body is a
testimonial communication. First, under what circumstances does
an aggravating factor for concealment compel a testimonial
communication? Second, is the act of producing a body a
testimonial communication even though the body is physical
evidence?
a.

Conditional Versus Unconditional Penalties

Determining when an aggravating factor for concealment
compels a testimonial communication requires one to examine
what the State is punishing. There are two possibilities. The State
may be unconditionally punishing a defendant exclusively for the
act of concealing a body. A punishment is unconditional if the
State does not link the punishment to the defendant’s willingness
144
On the other hand, the State
to reveal the location of the body.
may be conditionally punishing the defendant for the act of
concealing the body. A punishment is conditional if the State links
the defendant’s punishment to the willingness of the defendant to
145
reveal the location of the body.
An unconditional aggravating factor for concealment would
not fall within the testimonial communication element. With this
aggravating factor, the State would be punishing the defendant but
would not be directing the punishment at a failure to
communicate. The right against self-incrimination is passive,
meaning simply that there should be no penalty for silence. The

noncommunicative in nature . . . .”).
142. Id. at 763-64.
143. See id. at 764. For example, the Supreme Court held in Schmerber that
“blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was
neither petitioner’s testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.” Id. at 765.
144. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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privilege by definition cannot protect the act of concealing a body,
because concealment is an affirmative step. Actions like concealing
evidence or driving at illegal speeds to evade arrest are both
affirmative actions that the privilege does not protect even though
the inability to do both might create a higher risk of incrimination.
Unconditionally punishing the action of concealing a body is a
legitimate means of punishing socially undesirable conduct.
In contrast, a conditional aggravating factor for failure to
reveal the location of a body would fall within the testimonial
communication element. With this aggravating factor, the State
would be telling the defendant that failure to testify about the
location of the body would result in a higher sentence. The State
would be punishing the defendant for passively remaining silent.
The conditional aggravating factor for concealment thus creates a
penalty for failure to testify.
Precedent from the Washington state courts supports the
distinction between conditional and unconditional aggravating
146
factors for concealment.
The Washington cases are particularly
persuasive because Washington, like Minnesota, requires
“substantial and compelling circumstances” to justify departure
147
from its sentencing guidelines.
In State v. Crutchfield, the
Washington Court of Appeals held that “by ruling that
concealment can be an aggravating factor, we would be holding
that the defendant who exercises his constitutional right not to
incriminate himself by refusing to reveal the location of the victim’s
148
body, has thereby operated to increase his own punishment.”
The Washington Court of Appeals clarified Crutchfield in State v.
Rich, holding that “[b]ecause a person has a constitutional right
not to incriminate himself, the court cannot rely on the
defendant’s failure to reveal the location of a victim’s body as an
aggravating factor. But a defendant’s affirmative steps to conceal a
149
crime can support an exceptional sentence.”
146. State v. Crutchfield, 771 P.2d 746 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
147. Compare Crutchfield, 771 P.2d at 750 (“[T]he reviewing court must
independently determine whether, as a matter of law, the trial court’s reasons
justify an exceptional sentence. There must be ‘substantial and compelling’
reasons for imposing such a sentence.” (citations omitted)), with State v. Leja, 684
N.W.2d 442, 448 (Minn. 2004) (“[T]here must be ‘substantial and compelling
circumstances’ in the record to justify a departure.” (citations omitted)).
148. 771 P.2d at 752.
149. No. 28342-5-II, 2003 Wash. Ct. App. LEXIS 1387, at *11-12 (Wash. Ct.
App. July 8, 2003) (citations omitted). State v. Vaughn provides more authority for
the distinction between conditional and unconditional departures for
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A Ninth Circuit case, Dallas v. Arave, provides further support
for the distinction between a conditional and unconditional
150
aggravating factor.
In Dallas, the State accused the defendant of
151
killing two Idaho game wardens and concealing their bodies.
The jury found the defendant guilty of two manslaughters and
152
concealment.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had to determine
whether the concealment conviction violated the defendant’s right
153
The court noted that although the
against self-incrimination.
district court relied on the defendant’s refusal to reveal the
location of the body, it cited sufficient other reasons related
directly to the act of concealment to justify the conviction
154
independent of the failure to disclose the location afterward.
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not primarily base
the conviction on the defendant’s refusal to testify against his own
155
interests.
concealment. See 924 P.2d 27, 32-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). In Vaughn, the court
of appeals affirmed a district court departure for a crime where the defendant
took “affirmative steps” to conceal the crime, including hiding evidence and
creating an alibi. Id. at 33. The court held that the departure did not violate the
defendant’s right against self-incrimination. Id. It found that Vaughn was distinct
from Crutchfield because the defendant’s failure to reveal the location of the body
was the reason for departure in Crutchfield, but the defendant’s affirmative steps to
conceal the crime were the justification for departure in Vaughn. Id.
150. 984 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1993).
151. Id. at 294.
152. Id. at 294-95. The conviction for concealment was an independent crime
and not an aggravating factor for the manslaughter convictions. See id. The case
does not cite the specific statute that the defendant violated, but it was probably
the following statute:
Every person who, knowing that any . . . object, matter or thing, is about
to be produced, used or discovered as evidence upon any trial,
proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully
destroys, alters or conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it
from being produced, used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor
....
IDAHO CODE § 18-2603 (2005).
153. Dallas, 984 F.2d at 297. The court seemed to treat the defendant’s appeal
with skepticism because “[t]he privilege must be invoked in a timely fashion . . .
[and the defendant] did not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege until he raised
it on appeal.” Id. The court may have relied on an incorrect understanding of the
law when making this point, because this was probably a penalty situation where
assertion of the privilege was unnecessary.
See supra notes 135-36 and
accompanying text.
154. Dallas, 984 F.2d at 297.
155. Id. The court affirmed part of the reasoning of the district court when it
held that the defendant “could have let someone know the location of the grave
once he was ‘free or had been removed from the scene and had not been
discovered.’” Id. This part of the court’s reasoning is problematic. Although it is
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These cases support the distinction between conditional and
unconditional punishments. In Crutchfield, the aggravating factor
violated the right against self-incrimination because it conditionally
punished the defendant for not revealing the location of the
156
body.
In Rich, the aggravating factor did not violate the right
against self-incrimination because it was an unconditional penalty
only for affirmative steps taken by the defendant to conceal the
157
body.
In Dallas, the Ninth Circuit concluded, at least implicitly,
that requiring a defendant to tell the State about the location of a
body would be a testimonial communication, but punishing the
158
defendant directly for the act of concealing the body would not.
The aggravating factor does not penalize a testimonial
communication if the State directs the punishment at the
affirmative action of concealment, but if the State directs the
punishment at a failure to reveal the location of a body it is
compelling a testimonial communication.
The current law in Minnesota coerces defendants into
testimonial communication by punishing defendants conditionally
under the aggravating factor of concealment. The Shiue case
offered two rationales for making concealment an aggravating
159
factor under Minnesota law. First, families suffer emotional harm
160
The court pointed out that
from the concealment of a body.
“[f]or five months, Jason Wilkman’s family suffered a great deal of
161
trauma, not knowing whether their son was dead or alive.”
Similarly, in Murr, the court concluded that concealment of the
body “caused Theodore Murr’s family great anguish to be without
162
knowledge of his whereabouts for more than seven weeks.”
The status of the emotional harm rationale under Minnesota
law is unclear. The Leja majority opinion mentioned both
163
rationales but only discussed the deterring bargain rationale.
The dissent complained about the failure of the majority to address
theoretically possible for a defendant to reveal the location of the body without
incrimination, the State would still be coercing a testimonial communication and
any method that the defendant could use to reveal the information would
probably carry an unreasonable risk of self-incrimination.
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
161. State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. 1982).
162. State v. Murr, 443 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
163. State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Minn. 2004).
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164

the emotional harm rationale.
There is, however, reason to
believe that this rationale is still valid under Minnesota law. The
Minnesota Supreme Court did not explicitly reverse this rationale,
and it may be the justification for departure in situations where
there is no bargaining.
The emotional harm rationale suggests that the courts are
punishing defendants conditionally based on their willingness to
reveal the location of a body. Imagine if a court issued a higher
sentence to a defendant because he inflicted emotional harm on
the victim’s family throughout the trial by refusing to plead guilty
at the beginning of the trial. There is little difference between this
seemingly extreme example and the emotional harm rationale.
The courts in both Murr and Shiue mentioned the specific length of
time that the families suffered emotional harm because of the
165
defendants’ failure to reveal the location of the bodies. It would
be acceptable to punish a defendant for concealing a body.
However, punishing a defendant for the ongoing emotional harm
that families suffer is a conditional punishment for failure to reveal
the location of a body because confessing would be the only way
that the defendant could stop the clock from running.
The second reason offered by the court in Shiue was the
166
deterring bargaining rationale.
The court noted that the
defendant “negotiated an agreement to disclose the whereabouts of
the body in exchange for an agreement to forego prosecution for
first-degree murder. Other accused persons could view this as an
167
appropriate tool in negotiating a plea.”
Similarly, in Shoebottom,
the court cited the defendant’s bargaining with the authorities
about the location of the victim’s body as a rationale for
168
departure.
This rationale for departure is legitimate post-Leja,
because the court in Leja specifically applied the bargaining
169
rationale.
The deterring-bargaining rationale also suggests that the

164. Id. at 457 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting) (“After recognizing that this was a
‘gruesome crime’ involving ‘particular cruelty’ and that Leja’s actions were
‘reprehensible,’ it is inconceivable that the majority could find that her conduct
fails to reach the threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances needed to
justify an upward durational departure.”).
165. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
167. State v. Shiue, 326 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. 1982).
168. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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courts are punishing defendants conditionally. As has already been
discussed, defendants have the right to remain silent about
incriminating information. Therefore, the State has two options.
Its first option is to allow the defendant to remain silent. Its second
option is to create incentives for the defendant to waive the
privilege freely like plea-bargaining. The defendant has a right to
any promise that the State offers in exchange for waiving the
privilege because the defendant only waives the privilege on
condition that the defendant will receive the benefit of the bargain.
The deterring-bargaining rationale operates as a penalty for
silence because it has the effect of neutralizing the strategic benefit
of the privilege to a defendant. Prosecutors do not like the
strategic benefit that the privilege offers defendants during pleabargaining. The deterring-bargaining rationale is simply a means
of subverting and neutralizing the strategic benefit that comes from
the right against self-incrimination by allowing the courts to impose
a greater penalty to offset any benefit that comes to the defendant
from revealing the incriminating information. The effect is to
coerce the defendant into waiving the privilege while not allowing
the defendant to enjoy the benefit of the waiver. The State can
choose not to bargain with a defendant if it wishes, but it cannot
ask the court to punish the defendant for enjoying the strategic
benefit that flows from waiver of the privilege.
One last factor, as indicated by the court in Shiue, suggests that
Minnesota
law
punishes
defendants
conditionally
for
170
concealment. The court stated that “by including concealment as
an aggravating factor, the authorities or counsel for an accused are
in a position to advise that such refusal may lead to an increased
171
sentence.”
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine what the
court is referring to with the words “such refusal.” The most likely
interpretation is that the authorities can warn a defendant that
there will be an increased sentence for refusal to reveal the location
of the body. Assuming that this is the case, Minnesota law punishes
defendants conditionally for their failure to reveal the location of
the body. Both the rationales of the court and the language of the
court in Shiue suggest that Minnesota’s aggravating factor for
concealment is a conditional penalty for failure to reveal the
location of a body.

170.
171.

Shiue, 326 N.W.2d at 655.
Id.
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The Testimonial Aspects of Producing a Body

Some courts have discussed the extent to which providing
physical evidence to the State constitutes a testimonial
communication.
Physical evidence is not a testimonial
172
communication by itself.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the act of producing evidence for the authorities could
itself be an incriminating testimonial communication even if the
privilege does not protect the evidence that the authorities
173
request.
Some cases have applied this principle to determine whether a
court-ordered motion to compel a defendant to produce a weapon
is a testimonial communication. In Commonwealth v. Hughes, a
grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of assault with a
174
deadly weapon.
The district court ordered the defendant to
175
produce a weapon that the State believed was in his possession.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that compelling
production of the weapon was an incriminating testimonial
176
communication.
Compelling the defendant to produce the
revolver would implicitly communicate information about the
177
“existence, location, and control” of the weapon to the State.
Producing the weapon would also be an implicit authentication of
178
The court concluded that even if the prosecution
the weapon.
never referenced the defendant’s production of the gun, it might
have other potentially incriminating effects because the police
179
would conduct tests on the weapon.
172. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
173. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984). The Supreme
Court held that the act of producing a document could be a testimonial
communication even if the document itself is not. Id. Compliance with a
subpoena could be a testimonial communication under some circumstances
because the accused could tacitly concede that the papers were in the defendant’s
possession and that the papers are the ones that the State requested. Id. The
Court held that a case-by-case analysis of the facts is necessary to determine
whether producing evidence is itself a testimonial communication. Id.
174. 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (Mass. 1980).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1244.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1246 (“The Commonwealth could use such [implicit statements as
to existence, location, and control] . . . to secure other incriminating evidence to
put before the jury, and it can be assumed that the testimonial statement as to the
location of the gun would be used, mediately, to lead to ballistics tests and
ballistics evidence and an opinion thereon.”).
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In Goldsmith v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeals
180
The State charged the defendant
considered a similar a case.
181
with three crimes involving the use of a gun.
The district court
182
On appeal, the
ordered the defendant to produce the weapon.
court had to determine whether compelled production of the gun
183
was an incriminating testimonial communication.
The court
followed Hughes and held that “compelled production of a weapon,
allegedly used to commit the crimes charged, is a testimonial
communication within the meaning of the privilege against self184
incrimination.”
Although the privilege does not protect the victim’s body itself,
it does protect the defendant against having to make incriminating
testimonial statements to authorities about the location of the
body. Hughes and Goldsmith demonstrate that the act of providing
information about physical evidence to authorities can be a
185
testimonial communication.
There is no distinction between
producing a gun and producing a victim’s body, except that
producing the body would be more incriminating. Requiring the
defendant to produce the body provides testimony about the
location of the body, the identity of the body, the defendant’s prior
contact with the body, and physical evidence that the authorities
186
can use to find additional incriminating evidence.
3.

The Incriminating Element

The incriminating element includes any testimonial
communication that a person “reasonably believes could be used in
a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
187
be so used.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the
privilege:
protects a person from being compelled to disclose the
circumstances of his offense, the sources from which or
the means by which evidence of its commission or of his
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
Hogan,
(1951).

199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 373.
See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972); see also Malloy v.
378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
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connection with it may be obtained, or made effectual for
his conviction, without using his answers as direct
188
admissions against him.
It would be incriminating for a defendant to reveal the location of
189
When a defendant reveals
a concealed body to the State.
information about the location of a concealed body, the defendant
also reveals that he has had direct contact with the body.
Furthermore, the location of the body is a link in the chain of
evidence that could lead the police to more incriminating
190
evidence.
They may uncover additional evidence through
testing, autopsy, and expert testimony once the body is in their
191
Revealing the location of a body is an incriminating
possession.
testimonial communication under the right against selfincrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
In Leja, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified conflicting
precedents dealing with the aggravating factor for concealment
and held that departure for concealment is justified when a
defendant either (1) bargains or (2) commits aggravating factors
192
beyond concealment.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a
State violates a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when it
193
The
compels an incriminating testimonial communication.
Minnesota aggravating factor for concealment is compulsion
because it imposes higher prison sentences; it is a testimonial
communication because it requires the defendant to communicate

188. State v. Gardiner, 88 Minn. 130, 139-40, 92 N.W. 529, 533 (1902).
189. State v. Crutchfield, 771 P.2d 746, 752 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he net
effect of allowing concealment to be an aggravating factor in the ordinary case is
to punish the defendant for not disclosing the location of the victim’s body. If
[the defendant] had disclosed it, it would surely have incriminated him.”); cf.
Goldsmith, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (“[P]roduction of a yet unlocated weapon is
incriminating: ‘The revolver is the supposed instrumentality of the crime, and
control or possession after the event, taken together with the earlier ownership
attested by the registration, would tend to establish possession at the critical
time.’”).
190. Cf. Goldsmith, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (holding that producing a gun is an
important link in the chain of evidence that would allow the authorities to find
additional incriminating evidence through testing and expert testimony).
191. Cf. id. (explaining that when the Commonwealth has the gun, it “will run
ballistics tests, and these may lead to expert testimony”).
192. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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the location of the body; and it is incriminating because the
perpetrator of the crime is usually the only person who knows
where the body is concealed.
Minnesota’s aggravating factor unconstitutionally imposes a
194
penalty, which is prima facie unconstitutional.
Leja was a step in
the right direction, but it did not go far enough because the
aggravating factor, as it exists under Leja, still produces violations of
the right against self-incrimination. The Minnesota Supreme Court
should address the specific issue of self-incrimination and should
rule that the aggravating factor is an unconditional punishment
directed at the action of concealing a body. The court should
make it clear that the aggravating factor is not linked to whether a
defendant reveals the location of the body. This would be an
important step toward assuring the fair and just operation of the
right against self-incrimination in protecting the adversarial
process.

194.

See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/10

26

